Conte aos seus amigos sobre este item:
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations Peter D. Feaver
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
Peter D. Feaver
How do civilians control the military? In his book, Feaver proposes a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state.
400 pages, 38 line illustrations, 15 tables
| Mídia | Livros Paperback Book (Livro de capa flexível e brochura) |
| Lançado | 15 de março de 2005 |
| ISBN13 | 9780674017610 |
| Editoras | Harvard University Press |
| Páginas | 400 |
| Dimensões | 150 × 228 × 26 mm · 560 g |
| Idioma | Inglês |